We present partial strategyproofness, a new, relaxed notion of strategyproofness for studying the incentive properties of non-strategyproof assignment mechanisms. Informally, a mechanism is partially strategyproof if it makes truthful reporting a dominant strategy for those agents whose preference intensities differ sufficiently between any two objects. We demonstrate that partial strategyproofness is axiomatically motivated and that it provides a unified perspective on incentives in the assignment domain. We then apply it to derive novel insights about the incentive properties of the Probabilistic Serial mechanism and different variants of the Boston mechanism.
Introduction
The assignment problem is concerned with the allocation of indivisible objects to selfinterested agents who have private preferences over these objects. Monetary transfers are not permitted, which makes this problem different from auctions and other problems with transferable utility. In practice, assignment problems often arise in situations that are of great importance to people's lives; for example, when assigning students to seats at public schools (Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez, 2003) , medical school graduates to entry level positions (Roth, 1984) , or tenants to subsidized housing (Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez, 1998) .
In this paper, we study ordinal assignment mechanisms, which are mechanisms for the assignment problem that take preference orders over objects as input. As mechanism designers, we care specifically about incentives for truthtelling under the mechanisms we design. A mechanism is strategyproof if truthtelling is a dominant strategy equilibrium. Participating in a strategyproof mechanism is simple for the agents because it eliminates the need to take the preferences or strategies of other agents into account. Strategyproofness thus yields a robust prediction of equilibrium behavior. These and other advantages explain the popularity of strategyproofness as an incentive concepts (Pathak and Sönmez, 2008; Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak and Roth, 2009 ).
The advantages of strategyproofness, however, come at a cost: Zhou (1990) showed that, in the assignment problem, it is impossible to achieve the optimum with respect to incentives, efficiency, and fairness simultaneously. 1 This makes the assignment problem an interesting mechanism design challenge. For example, the Random Serial Dictatorship mechanism is strategyproof and anonymous, but only ex-post efficient. In fact, it is conjectured to be the unique mechanism that satisfies all three properties (Lee and Sethuraman, 2011; Bade, 2016) . The more demanding ordinal efficiency is achieved by the Probabilistic Serial mechanism, but any mechanism that achieves ordinal efficiency and symmetry cannot be strategyproof (Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001) . Finally, rank efficiency, an even stronger efficiency concept, can be achieved with Rank Value mechanisms (Featherstone, 2015) , but it is incompatible with strategyproofness, even without additional fairness requirements. Obviously, strategyproofness is in conflict with many other desiderata, and mechanism designers are therefore interested in studying non-strategyproof mechanisms. This highlights the need for good tools to capture the incentive properties of non-strategyproof mechanisms and to analyze what trade-offs are possible between incentives for truthtelling and other desiderata.
In practice, non-strategyproof mechanisms are ubiquitous. Examples include variants of the Boston mechanism that are used in many cities for the assignment of seats at public schools, 2 a rank-efficient mechanism for the assignment of teachers to positions through the Teach for America program (Featherstone, 2015) , a mechanism for the assignment of on-campus housing at MIT that minimizes the number of unassigned units, 3 and the HBS Draft mechanism for the assignment of schedules at Harvard Business School (Budish and Cantillon, 2012) . It is therefore important to understand the incentive properties of these mechanisms beyond the fact that they are "not fully strategyproof."
The incompatibility of strategyproofness with other desiderata in theory and the prevalence of non-strategyproof assignment mechanisms in practice explain why researchers have been calling for useful relaxations of strategyproofness (Budish, 2012) . 4 In this paper, we introduce partial strategyproofness, a new, relaxed notion of strategyproofness that is particularly suited to the analysis of assignment mechanisms. We first illustrate the definition of partial strategyproofness with a motivating example, and subsequently, we explain our main results and what they mean for mechanism design. Consider a setting with three agents, conveniently named 1, 2, 3, and three objects, a, b, c, with unit capacity. Suppose that the agents' preferences are
that agent 1 has utility 0 for its last choice c; and that the non-strategyproof Probabilistic 2 Variants of the Boston mechanism are used in Minneapolis, Seattle, Lee County (Kojima andÜnver, 2014) , San Diego, Freiburg (Germany) (Dur, Mennle and Seuken, 2017) , and throughout the German state of Nordrhein Westfalen (Basteck, Huesmann and Nax, 2015) . 3 Source: MIT Division of Student Life, retrieved September 8, 2015: https://housing.mit.edu/, and personal communication 4 Prior work has already led to some useful concepts for this purpose, e.g., the comparison by vulnerability to manipulation (Pathak and Sönmez, 2013) or strategyproofness in the large (Azevedo and Budish, 2015) . We describe their relation to partial strategyproofness in Sections 4.3 and 4.4 respectively.
Serial mechanism (Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001 ) is used to assign the objects. If all agents report their preferences truthfully, then agent 1 receives a, b, c with probabilities 3{4, 0, 1{4 respectively. If agent 1 instead reports
then these probabilities change to 1{2, 1{3, 1{6. Observe that whether or not the misreport P 1 1 increases agent 1's expected utility depends on how intensely it prefers a over b: If u 1 paq is close to u 1 pbq, then agent 1 would benefit from the misreport P 1 1 . If u 1 paq is significantly larger than u 1 pbq, then agent 1 would prefer to report truthfully. Specifically, agent 1 prefers to report truthfully if 3{4¨u 1 paq ě u 1 pbq.
Our definition of partial strategyproofness generalizes the intuition from this motivating example: For some bound r in r0, 1s, we say that agent i's utility function u i satisfies uniformly relatively bounded indifference with respect to r (URBI(r)) if r¨u i paq ě u i pbq holds whenever i prefers a to b (after appropriate normalization). A mechanism is r-partially strategyproof if it makes truthful reporting a dominant strategy for any agent whose utility function satisfies URBI(r). For example, as we show in Section 5.1, the Probabilistic Serial mechanism has a degree of strategyproofness of exactly r " 3{4 in the setting of the motivating example. Thus, we can give honest and useful strategic advice to agents facing this mechanism: In this setting, if they value their second choice at least a factor 3{4 less than their first choice, then they are best off reporting their preferences truthfully.
We argue that partial strategyproofness is a natural and useful way to think about the incentive properties of non-strategyproof assignment mechanisms, and we present three main arguments that support this claim:
Partial strategyproofness has a compelling axiomatic motivation. We first prove that full strategyproofness can be decomposed into three simple axioms. Each of the axioms restricts the way in which a mechanism can react when an agent swaps two consecutively ranked objects in its preference report (e.g., from P i : a ą b to P 1 i : b ą a). 1. A mechanism is swap monotonic if either the swap makes it more likely that the agent receives b (the object that it claims to prefer), or the mechanism does not react to the swap at all. In other words, any swap must directly affect the agent's probabilities for the objects that are swapped, and the change must be monotonic in the agent's reported preferences.
2.
A mechanism is upper invariant if no agent can improve its chances for objects that it likes more by misrepresenting its preferences for objects that it likes less. Precisely, the swap of a and b must not affect the agent's chances for any object that it strictly prefers to a.
3.
A mechanism is lower invariant if no agent can affect its chances for less-preferred objects by swapping a and b. This axiom is the complement to upper invariance but for objects that the agent likes strictly less than b.
For our first main result, we show that strategyproofness can be decomposed into these three axioms: A mechanism is strategyproof if and only if it is swap monotonic, upper invariant, and lower invariant (Theorem 1). Intuitively, lower invariance is the least important of the three axioms, and by dropping it, we arrive at the larger class of partially strategyproof mechanisms: We show that a mechanism is r-partially strategyproof for some r ą 0 if and only if it is swap monotonic and upper invariant (Theorem 2). Thus, partial strategyproofness describes the incentive properties of (non-strategyproof) mechanisms that satisfy the two most important of the three axioms. 5 Partial strategyproofness tightly parametrizes a broad spectrum of incentive concepts. Since all utility functions satisfy URBIp1q, full strategyproofness is obviously the upper limit concept for r-partial strategyproofness as r approaches 1. Regarding the lower limit, lexicographic dominance (LD) (Cho, 2012) is the weakest among the common dominance notions: 6 It is implied by all of them, but at the same time it is the only one under which all pairs of lotteries over objects are comparable. In this sense, the corresponding LD-strategyproofness is a minimal notion of strategyproofness for random assignment mechanisms. We prove that LD-strategyproofness is the lower limit concept for r-partial strategyproofness as r approaches 0 (Proposition 2). The degree of strategyproofness thus parametrizes the entire spectrum of incentive concepts between the most demanding full strategyproofness and the minimal LD-strategyproofness.
Regarding tightness, observe that r-partial strategyproofness is formally equivalent to strategyproofness on the restricted domain of utility functions that satisfy URBI(r). We prove that this domain restriction is maximal for r-partially strategyproof mechanisms: Specifically, for any utility function that violates URBI(r), we can construct an r-partially strategyproof mechanism that is manipulable for an agent with this utility function (Proposition 1). Therefore, no other single-parameter measure conveys strictly more information about a mechanism's incentive properties than the degree of strategyproofness.
Partial strategyproofness provides a unified perspective on incentives. Various relaxed notions of strategyproofness have been employed in prior work to describe the incentive properties of non-strategyproof assignment mechanisms. Partial strategyproofness provides a unified perspective on these because it implies all of them in meaningful ways (Theorem 3): r-partial strategyproofness for some r ą 0 implies weak SD-strategyproofness (Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001) and convex strategyproofness (Balbuzanov, 2015); a positive degree of strategyproofness r ą 0 implies ε-approximate strategyproofness (Carroll, 2013) (where ε is guaranteed to be close to 0 for r sufficiently close to 1); if the degree of strategyproofness of a mechanism converges to 1 in large markets, then this mechanism is strategyproof in the large (Azevedo and Budish, 2015); and the converse holds for neither of these implications. The relation to approximate strategyproofness is especially important because it allows us to further refine the strategic advice we can give: By definition of r-partial strategyproofness, agents are best off reporting their preferences truthfully if their preference intensities for any two objects differ sufficiently (by the factor r); otherwise, if they are close to being indifferent between some objects, then we now know that their potential gain from misreporting may be positive but it is bounded (by the corresponding value of ε).
We conclude that the axiomatic motivation, the ability to parametrize a broad spectrum of incentive properties, and the unified perspective on incentives make the partial strategyproofness concept an important addition to the mechanism designer's toolbox. To illustrate its usefulness in mechanism design, we provide two applications: First, we show that it yields the most demanding description of the incentive properties of the Probabilistic Serial mechanism in finite settings (refining (Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001; Balbuzanov, 2015) ) as well as in the limit as markets get large (refining (Kojima and Manea, 2010; Azevedo and Budish, 2015) ). Second, we show that the concept can be used to distinguish between two common variants of the Boston mechanism in terms of their incentive properties: Under the classical Boston mechanism (BM) (Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez, 2003) , all applications in round k go to the students' k th choices, but under the adaptive Boston mechanism (ABM) (Alcalde, 1996; Miralles, 2008; Harless, 2015; Dur, 2015) , students apply to their respective best available school in each round. Intuitively, one would expect ABM to have better incentive properties than BM because strategic skipping of exhausted schools is not a useful heuristic for manipulation under ABM. However, formalizing this intuition is surprisingly challenging (Dur, Mennle and Seuken, 2017) . Using our new partial strategyproofness concept, we can now show formally that ABM indeed has better incentive properties than BM: When priorities are random, ABM is partially strategyproof while BM is not. These examples demonstrate that partial strategyproofness generates new insights in the analysis of non-strategyproof assignment mechanisms.
Model
A setting pN, M,consists of a set of agents N with n " |N |, a set of objects M with m " |M |, and capacities q " pq 1 , . . . , q m q (i.e., q j units of object j are available). We assume n ď ř jPM q j (i.e., there are not more agents than the total number of units; otherwise we include a dummy object with capacity n). Each agent i P N has a strict preference order P i over objects, where P i : a ą b indicates that agent i prefers object a to object b. Let P be the set of all possible preference orders over M . A preference profile P " pP i q iPN P P N is a collection of preference orders of all agents, and P´i P P N ztiu is a collection of preference orders of all agents except i. We extend agents' preferences over objects to preferences over lotteries via von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions: Every agent i is endowed with a utility function u i : M Ñ R`that is consistent with P i (i.e., u i paq ą u i pbq whenever P i : a ą b), and U P i denotes the set of all utility functions that are consistent with P i . An assignment is represented by an nˆm-matrix x " px i,j q iPN,jPM . The value x i,j is the probability that agent i gets object j. The i th row x i " px i,j q jPM of x is called the assignment vector of i (or i's assignment). x is feasible if no object is assigned beyond capacity (i.e., ř iPN x i,j ď q j for all j P M ) and each agent receives some object with certainty (i.e., ř jPM x i,j " 1 for all i P N and x i,j ě 0 for all i P N, j P M ). Unless explicitly stated otherwise, we only consider feasible assignments throughout this paper.
x is called deterministic if x i,j P t0, 1u for all i P N, j P M . The Birkhoff-von Neumann Theorem and its extensions (Budish et al., 2013) ensure that, for any given assignment, we can find a lottery over deterministic assignments that implements the respective marginal probabilities. Finally, we denote by X and ∆pXq the sets of all deterministic and random assignments respectively.
A mechanism is a mapping f : P N Ñ ∆pXq that selects an assignment based on a preference profile. f i pP i , P´iq denotes i's assignment when i reports P i and the other agents report P´i. The mechanism f is deterministic if it only selects deterministic assignments (i.e., f : P N Ñ X). Finally, given an agent i with a utility function u i who reports P i when the other agents report P´i, that agent's expected utility is
A New Decomposition of Strategyproofness
In this section, we formally define strategyproofness, we introduce three axioms, and we show that strategyproofness decomposes into these axioms.
The most common and most demanding incentive concept for the design of assignment mechanisms requires that agents maximize their expected utility by reporting their ordinal preferences truthfully, independent of the other agents' preference reports. Definition 1. A mechanism f is expected-utility strategyproof (EU-strategyproof) if, for all agents i P N , all preference profiles pP i , P´iq P P N , all misreports P 1 i P P, and all utility functions
Alternatively, strategyproofness can be defined in terms of stochastic dominance: For a preference order P i P P and two assignment vectors x i and y i , we say that x i stochastically dominates y i at P i if, for all objects a P M , we have ÿ jPM with P i :jąa
In words, i's chances of obtaining one of its top-k choices are weakly higher under x i than under y i for all ranks k. A mechanism f is stochastic dominance strategyproof (SD-strategyproof) if, for all agents i P N , all preference profiles pP i , P´iq P P N , and all misreports P 1 i P P, i's assignment f i pP i , P´iq stochastically dominates f i pP 1 i , P´iq at P i . SD-strategyproofness and EU-strategyproofness are equivalent (Erdil, 2014), and we therefore refer to this property as (full) strategyproofness.
Next, we introduce three axioms that are related to incentives. Their formal definitions require the auxiliary concepts of neighborhoods and contour sets: The neighborhood of a preference order P i is the set of all preference orders that differ from P i by a swap of two consecutively ranked objects, denoted N P i (e.g., the neighborhood of P i : a ą b ą c contains P 1 i : b ą a ą c but does not contain P 2 i : c ą a ą b). The upper contour set of j at P i is the set of objects that i strictly prefers to j, denoted U pj, P i q. Conversely, the lower contour set of j at P i is the set of objects that i likes strictly less than j, denoted Lpj, P i q. For example, the upper contour set of b at P i : a ą b ą c ą d is U pb, P i q " tau and the lower contour set is Lpb, P i q " tc, du.
Swapping two consecutively ranked objects in the true preference order (or equivalently, reporting a preference order from the neighborhood of the true preference order) is a basic misreport. The axioms we define limit the ways in which a mechanism can change an agent's assignment when this agent uses such a basic kind of misreport.
Axiom 1 (Swap Monotonicity). A mechanism f is swap monotonic if, for all agents i P N , all preference profiles pP i , P´iq P P N , and all misreports P 1 i P N P i from the neighborhood of P i with P i : a ą b but P 1 i : b ą a, one of the following holds:
• either:
In words, swap monotonicity requires that the mechanism reacts to the swap in a direct and monotonic way: If the swap that brings b forward affects the agent's assignment at all, then at least its assignment for b must be affected directly. Moreover, this change must be monotonic in the sense that the agent's assignment for b must increase strictly when b is reportedly more preferred. For deterministic mechanisms, swap monotonicity is equivalent to strategyproofness (Proposition 5 in Section E of the Online Appendix). For the more general class of random mechanisms, swap monotonicity is weaker than strategyproofness but prevents a certain obvious kind of manipulability: Consider a mechanism that assigns an agent's reported first choice with probability 1{3 and its reported second choice with probability 2{3. The agent is unambiguously better off by ranking its second choice first. Swap monotonicity precludes such opportunities for manipulation. Nevertheless, even swap monotonic mechanisms may be manipulable in a stochastic dominance sense, as the next example shows.
Example 1. Consider a setting with four objects a, b, c, d and a single agent i with preference order P i : a ą b ą c ą d. Suppose that reporting a preference for b over c leads to an assignment of x i " p0, 1{2, 0, 1{2q for a, b, c, d respectively, and reporting a preference for c over b leads to y i " p1{2, 0, 1{2, 0q. This is consistent with swap monotonicity; yet, the latter assignment stochastically dominates the former at P i .
Note that the misreport in Example 1 affects the agent's assignment for a, an object that the agent strictly prefers to both b and c, the objects that get swapped. Our next axiom precludes such effects.
Axiom 2 (Upper Invariance). A mechanism f is upper invariant if, for all agents i P N , all preference profiles pP i , P´iq P P N , and all misreports P 1
Intuitively, upper invariance ensures that agents cannot influence their chances of obtaining more-preferred objects by changing the order of less-preferred objects. The axiom was originally introduced by Hashimoto et al. (2014) (who called it weak invariance). It was one of the central axioms in their characterization of the Probabilistic Serial mechanism. If an outside option is available and if the mechanism is individually rational, then upper invariance is equivalent to truncation robustness (i.e., no agent can benefit by ranking the outside option above acceptable objects). Many assignment mechanisms satisfy upper invariance, including Random Serial Dictatorship, Probabilistic Serial, the Boston mechanism, Deferred Acceptance (for agents on the proposing side), Top-Trade Cycles, and the HBS Draft mechanism.
Finally, our third axiom is symmetric to upper invariance but restricts how swaps can affect the assignment for less-preferred objects.
Axiom 3 (Lower Invariance). A mechanism f is lower invariant if, for all agents i P N , all preference profiles pP i , P´iq P P N , and all misreports P 1
In words, a mechanism is lower invariant if changing the order of two consecutively ranked objects does not affect the agents' chances of obtaining any less-preferred objects. Examples of lower invariant mechanisms are strategyproof mechanisms, like Random Serial Dictatorship and Top-Trade Cycles. In addition, Deferred Acceptance is lower invariant for agents on both sides.
Each of the three axioms affects incentives by preventing misreports from being beneficial in particular ways: Swap monotonicity forces mechanisms to change the probabilities for the respective objects directly and in the right direction, upper invariance is essentially equivalent to truncation robustness, and lower invariance mirrors upper invariance but for less-preferred objects. In combination, they give rise to our first main result, the decomposition of strategyproofness into these axioms.
Theorem 1 (Decomposition of Strategyproofness). A mechanism is strategyproof if and only if it is swap monotonic, upper invariant, and lower invariant.
Proof. Sufficiency (ñ). Assume towards contradiction that a mechanism f is strategyproof but not upper invariant. Then there exist an agent i P N , a preference profile
Without loss of generality, let j be i's most-preferred such object and f i,j pP 1 i , P´iq ą f i,j pP i , P´iq (otherwise, reverse the roles of P 1 i and P i ). Then f i pP i , P´iq does not stochastically dominate f j pP 1 i , P´iq, a contradiction to SD-strategyproofness. Lower invariance follows analogously, except that we take j to be the least-preferred object for which i's assignment changes.
By upper and lower invariance, any swap of consecutively ranked objects (e.g., from P i : a ą b to P 1 i : b ą a) leads to a re-distribution of probability between a and b. If reporting P 1 i leads to a strictly higher assignment for a, then f i pP 1 i , P´iq strictly stochastically dominates f i pP i , P´iq at P i , a contradiction. This implies swap monotonicity.
Necessity (ð). We invoke a result of Carroll (2012) that strategyproofness can be shown by verifying that no agent can benefit from swapping two consecutively ranked objects. Let f be a swap monotonic, upper invariant, and lower invariant mechanism, and consider an agent i P N , a preference profile pP i , P´iq P P N , and a misreport P 1
i , P´iq at P i : By upper and lower invariance, i's assignment for all objects remains constant under the misreport, except possibly for a and b; and, by swap monotonicity, i's assignments for a and b can only decrease and increase, respectively.
Theorem 1 highlights that strategyproofness is quite restrictive: If an agent swaps two objects (e.g., from P i : a ą b to P 1 i : b ą a), the only way in which a strategyproof 0 0 u i paq mechanism can react is by increasing that agent's assignment for b and decreasing its assignment for a by the same amount. The appeal of our decomposition in Theorem 1 lies in the choice of axioms, which are simple and easily motivated. They make the decomposition useful when verifying strategyproofness of mechanisms (e.g., see (Fack, Grenet and He, 2015) ) or when encoding strategyproofness as constraints under the automated mechanism design paradigm (Sandholm, 2003) .
Remark 1. While we focus on strict preferences in the present paper, Theorem 1 can be extended to the case of weak preferences; see (Mennle and Seuken, 2017a) .
Partial Strategyproofness
Recall the motivating example from the Introduction, where agent 1 was contemplating a misreport under the Probabilistic Serial mechanism. r " 3{4 was the pivotal degree of indifference between the agent's first and second choices, which determined whether the misreport was beneficial or not. The following domain restriction generalizes this intuition to agents who differentiate sufficiently between any two objects.
Definition 2. A utility function u i satisfies uniformly relatively bounded indifference with respect to r P r0, 1s (URBI(r)) if, for all objects a, b P M with u i paq ą u i pbq,
If min jPM pu i pjqq " 0 (i.e., i has utility 0 for its last choice), then inequality (6) simplifies to r¨u i paq ě u i pbq.
In words, it requires that agent i values b at least a factor r less than a. Consider Figure  1 for a geometric interpretation: The URBI(r) condition means that i's utility function (e.g., the point labeled u i ) cannot be arbitrarily close to the indifference hyperplane HpP i , P 1 i q, but it must lie within the shaded triangular area. r is the slope of the dashed line that bounds this area at the top. Any utility function in U P i that lies outside the shaded area (e.g., the point labeledũ i ) violates URBI(r). For convenience, we also use URBI(r) to denote the set of utility functions that satisfy the constraints.
We are now ready to formally define our new incentive concept.
Definition 3. Given a setting pN, M,and a bound r P r0, 1s, a mechanism f is r-partially strategyproof in pN, M,if, for all agents i P N , all preference profiles pP i , P´iq P P N , all misreports P 1 i P P, and all utility functions
In words, an r-partially strategyproof mechanisms makes truthful reporting a dominant strategy at least for those agents whose utility functions satisfy URBI(r). Since all utility functions satisfy URBIp1q, 1-partial strategyproofness is equivalent to full strategyproofness, and since the set URBI(r) is smaller for smaller r, the r-partial strategyproofness requirement is less demanding for smaller r.
A Decomposition of Partial Strategyproofness
For our second main result, we prove that dropping lower invariance but still requiring swap monotonicity and upper invariance leads to partial strategyproofness.
Theorem 2 (Decomposition of Partial Strategyproofness). Given a setting pN, M, qq, a mechanism is r-partially strategyproof for some r ą 0 if and only if it is swap monotonic and upper invariant.
Proof. We use the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Given a setting pN, M,and a mechanism f , the following are equivalent:
A. For all agents i P N , all preference profiles pP i , P´iq P P N , and all misreports P 1
The proof of Lemma 1 is given in Appendix A. The lemma establishes a connection between the behavior of mechanisms under arbitrary misreports (Statement A) and local properties (swap monotonicity and upper invariance in Statement B). In this sense, it replaces the local sufficiency result of Carroll (2012) we used to prove Theorem 1.
To show Theorem 2, we prove equivalence between partial strategyproofness and Statement A of Lemma 1. For the fixed setting pN, M, qq, let δ be the smallest non-zero variation in the assignment resulting from any change of report by any agent; formally,
Observe that δ is well-defined and strictly positive for any non-constant mechanism.
Necessity (partial strategyproofness ð A). For an agent i P N and a preference profile pP i , P´iq P P N , suppose that i considers misreport P 1 i P P. If f i pP i , P´iq ‰ f i pP 1 i , P´iq, then Statement A implies that there exists some object a for which i's assignment strictly decreases, and i's assignment for all more-preferred objects j P U pa, P i q remains unchanged. Since i's assignment for a changes, it must decrease by at least δ. Let b be the object that i ranks directly below a in P i . Then i's gain in expected utility from misreporting is greatest if, first, i receives a with probability δ and its last choice with probability p1´δq when being truthful, and second, i receives b with certainty when misreporting. The gain is therefore bounded from above by
which is weakly negative if
Inequality (10) holds for all utility functions in U P i XURBIpδq. Thus, if i's utility function satisfies URBIpδq, then no misreport increases i's expected utility, or equivalently, f is δ-partially strategyproof.
Sufficiency (partial strategyproofness ñ A). Let f be r-partially strategyproof for some r ą 0, and assume towards contradiction that f violates Statement A. This is equivalent to saying that there exist an agent i P N , a preference profile pP i , P´iq P P N , a misreport P 1
Again, let b be the object that i ranks directly below a in P i . Since i's assignment for a increases, it must increase by at least δ. Thus, i's gain in expected utility is smallest if, first, i receives b with certainty when being truthful, and second, i receives a with probability δ and its last choice with probability p1´δq when misreporting. This makeŝ
a lower bound on i's gain from misreporting. This bound is strictly positive if
which holds for all utility functions in U P i X URBI(r) for r ă δ. Therefore, f cannot be r-partially strategyproof for any r ą 0, a contradiction.
Theorem 2 provides an axiomatic motivation for our definition of partial strategyproofness: The class of partially strategyproof mechanisms consists exactly of those mechanisms that are swap monotonic and upper invariant, but may violate lower invariance.
Remark 2. Two main arguments suggest dropping lower invariance and keeping swap monotonicity and lower invariance as the most sensible approach towards relaxing strategyproofness. First, on the positive side, upper invariance is essentially equivalent to robustness to manipulation by truncation (Hashimoto et al., 2014) , and, for deterministic mechanisms, swap monotonicity is equivalent to strategyproofness (Proposition 5 in Section E of the Online Appendix). This isolates lower invariance as the least important of the three axioms. Second, on the negative side, dropping either swap monotonicity or upper invariance (instead of lower invariance) does not admit the construction of inter-esting ordinally efficient mechanisms: The Probabilistic Serial mechanism (Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001) is swap monotonic, upper invariant (but not lower invariant), and ordinally efficient, and it satisfies the additional axioms symmetry, anonymity, neutrality, and non-bossiness. 7 In contrast, no mechanism can be upper invariant, lower invariant, ordinally efficient, and symmetric (Theorem 1 of Mennle and Seuken (2017d)); and no mechanism can be swap monotonic, lower invariant, ordinally efficient, anonymous, neutral, and non-bossy (Theorem 2 of Mennle and Seuken (2017d) ).
Maximality of the URBI(r) Domain Restriction
In this section, we study how well the URBI(r) domain restriction captures the incentive properties of non-strategyproof assignment mechanisms. By definition, r-partial strategyproofness implies that the set URBI(r) must be contained in the set of utility functions for which truthful reporting is a dominant strategy. However, the two sets may not be exactly equal, as the following example shows.
Example 2. Consider a setting with 4 agents and 4 objects with unit capacity. In this setting, the adaptive Boston mechanism (Section 5.2) with priorities determined by a single uniform lottery is 1{3-partially strategyproof but not r-partially strategyproof for any r ą 1{3. However, it is a simple (though tedious) exercise to verify that an agent with utility function u i paq " 6, u i pbq " 2, u i pcq " 1, u i pdq " 0 cannot benefit from misreporting, independent of the reports from the other agents. But u i violates URBI p1{3q, since
Thus, the set of utility functions for which the adaptive Boston mechanism makes truthful reporting a dominant strategy is strictly larger than the set URBIp1{3q.
Example 2 shows that, for some specific r-partially strategyproof mechanism, there may exist utility functions that violate URBI(r) but for which truthful reporting is nonetheless a dominant strategy. This raises the question whether URBI(r) is "too small" in the sense that it excludes some utility functions for which all r-partially strategyproof mechanisms make truthful reporting a dominant strategy. Our next proposition dispels this concern because it shows maximality of the URBI(r) domain restriction.
Proposition 1 (Maximality). For all settings pN, M,with m ě 3 objects, all bounds r P p0, 1q, all preference ordersP i P P, and all utility functionsũ i P UP i that violate URBI(r), there exists a mechanismf such that 1.f is r-partially strategyproof and anonymous,
i ,P´iq rũ i s for some misreport P 1 i P P and all P´i P P N ztiu . Proof. We constructf explicitly. Ifũ i violates URBI(r), theñ
for some a, b P M andr ą r. Observe that b cannot be i's last choice because 0{ pũ i paq´min jPMũi pjqq ď r is trivially satisfied. Define the mechanismf by setting the assignment for the distinguished agent i as follows: Fix parameters δ a , δ b P r0, 1{ms; then, for all P´i P P N , all preference ordersP i P P, and all objects j P M , let
where d is the last choice underP i . For all other agents, distribute the remaining probabilities evenly. With parameters δ a , δ b P r0, 1{ms, this mechanism is well-defined. Next, let δ b " 1{m and choose δ a P rr{m,r{mq. It is straightforward to verify thatf is r-partially strategyproof but manipulable for agent i with utility functionũ i (Lemma 2 in Appendix B). To construct an anonymous mechanism with the same properties, we randomly assign each agent to the role of the distinguished agent i.
In words, Proposition 1 means that, for any utility function that violates URBI(r), there exists some r-partially strategyproof mechanism under which truthful reporting is not a dominant strategy for an agent with that utility function. Thus, unless we are given additional structural information about the mechanism besides the fact that it is r-partially strategyproof (and possibly anonymous), URBI(r) is in fact the largest set of utility functions for which truthful reporting is guaranteed to be a dominant strategy.
The Degree of Strategyproofness
Partial strategyproofness induces the following "measure" for incentive properties.
Definition 4. Given a setting pN, M,and a mechanism f , we define the degree of strategyproofness of f (in the setting pN, M, qq) as ρ pN,M,qq pf q " max tr P r0, 1s | f is r-partially strategyproof in pN, M, qqu . 8
Observe that, for 0 ď r ă r 1 ď 1 we have URBIprq Ă URBIpr 1 q by construction. Thus, a higher degree of strategyproofness corresponds to a stronger guarantee. By maximality from Proposition 1, the degree of strategyproofness constitutes a meaningful measure for incentive properties: If the only known attributes of f are that it is swap monotonic and upper invariant, then no single-parameter measure conveys strictly more information about the incentive properties of f .
The degree of strategyproofness can be used to compare two mechanisms by their incentive properties: ρ pN,M,qq pf q ą ρ pN,M,qq pgq means that f makes truthful reporting a dominant strategy on a strictly larger URBI(r) domain restriction than g does. In Section 5, we apply this comparison to differentiate three assignment mechanisms, namely the Probabilistic Serial mechanism and two variants of the Boston mechanism. 9 Furthermore, in (Mennle and Seuken, 2017b) , we used it to quantify trade-offs between strategyproofness and efficiency that are achievable by hybrid mechanisms (i.e., convex combinations of a strategyproof mechanism and a manipulable but more efficient mechanism).
Observe that the degree of strategyproofness parametrizes a spectrum of incentive concepts, where the upper limit of this spectrum is full strategyproofness. Conversely, we would also like to understand what the lower limit is. To answer this question, we consider the weaker notion of lexicographic dominance strategyproofness (Cho, 2012).
Definition 5. For a preference order P i P P and assignment vectors x i , y i , x i lexicographically dominates y i at P i if x i " y i , or x i,a ą y i,a for some a P M and x i,j " y i,j for all j P U pa, P i q. A mechanism f is lexicographic dominance strategyproof (LD-strategyproof) if, for all agents i P N , all preference profiles pP i , P´iq P P N , and all misreports P 1 i P P, i's assignment f i pP i , P´iq lexicographically dominates f i pP 1 i , P´iq at P i .
In words, an agent with lexicographic preferences prefers any (arbitrarily small) increase in the probability for any more-preferred object to any (arbitrarily large) increase in the probability for any less-preferred object; and LD-strategyproofness requires that such agents do not wish to misreport their preferences. Aziz, Brandt and Brill (2013) formalized a hierarchy of dominance notions consisting of trivial, deterministic, sure thing, and stochastic dominance. It is easy to see that lexicographic dominance is implied by all of them. However, in contrast to these other notions, all assignment vectors are comparable under lexicographic dominance. In this sense, LD-strategyproofness represents a minimal notion of strategyproofness.
The next proposition formalizes the upper and lower limits for the partial strategyproofness concept. 
Proof. Towards equality (16), observe that any utility function u i consistent with a strict preference order P i is also contained in URBI(r) for some r ă 1. A mechanism that is r-partially strategyproof for all r ă 1 therefore makes truthful reporting a dominant strategy for all utility functions. This implies EU-strategyproofness.
Equality (17) In words, Proposition 2 shows that there is no gap "at the top" between the least manipulable partially strategyproof mechanisms and those that are fully strategyproof, and there is no gap "at the bottom" between the most manipulable partially strategyproof mechanisms and mechanisms that are merely LD-strategyproof. The degree of strategyproofness thus parametrizes the entire spectrum of incentive concepts between the most demanding full strategyproofness and the minimal LD-strategyproofness.
An important consequence of Proposition 2 is that, for a fixed setting, any LDstrategyproof mechanism is already r-partially strategyproof for some r ą 0. On a technical level, this means that it suffices to verify LD-strategyproofness in order to show partial strategyproofness. We exploit this in Proposition 3 to show that the Probabilistic Serial mechanism is partially strategyproof. On the other hand, Proposition 2 exposes LD-strategyproofness as being unnecessarily weak for the accurate description of the incentive properties of non-strategyproof assignment mechanisms. The concept ignores the parametric nature of the set of utility functions for which truthful reporting is a dominant strategy. In contrast, partial strategyproofness provides quantitative guarantees for the mechanism's incentive properties, and these guarantees are maximal in the sense of Proposition 1.
A Unified Perspective on Incentives
In this section, we demonstrate that partial strategyproofness provides a unified perspective on the incentive properties of non-strategyproof assignment mechanisms. Proposition 2 already shows that it implies LD-strategyproofness. Expanding on this insight, we consider other relaxed incentive requirements that have previously been discussed in the context of the assignment problem, namely weak SD-strategyproofness (Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001), convex strategyproofness (Balbuzanov, 2015) , approximate strategyproofness (Carroll, 2013) , and strategyproofness in the large (Azevedo and Budish, 2015) . We formalize these requirements and we show in what sense they are implied by partial strategyproofness.
In their seminal work, Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) used weak SD-strategyproofness to describe the incentive properties of the Probabilistic Serial mechanism. Definition 6. A mechanism f is weakly SD-strategyproof if, for all agents i P N , all preference profiles pP i , P´iq P P N , and all misreports P 1 i P P, the assignment vector f i pP i , P´iq stochastically dominates f i pP 1 i , P´iq at P i whenever the two assignment vectors are comparable by stochastic dominance at P i .
Equivalently, this concept can be formulated in terms of expected utilities: A mechanism is weakly SD-strategyproof if, for all agents i P N , all preference profiles pP i , P´iq P P N , and all misreports P 1 i P P, there exists a utility function u
Observe that u i can depend on i, P i , P´i, and P 1 i , which makes this requirement very weak. The slightly stronger incentive concept of convex strategyproofness (Balbuzanov, 2015) arises if u i may only depend on i and P i but must be independent of P 1 i and P´i.
Definition 7. A mechanism f is convex strategyproof if, for all agents i P N and all preference orders P i P P, there exists a utility function u i P U P i such that, for all preferences P´i P P N ztiu and all misreports P 1 i P P, we have E f i pP i ,P´iq ru i s ě E f i pP 1 i ,P´iq ru i s.
Balbuzanov (2015) constructed a mechanism that is weakly SD-strategyproof but not convex strategyproof, which shows that the latter is a strictly stronger requirement.
While convex strategyproofness makes truthful reporting a dominant strategy for some agents, the different notion of approximate strategyproofness applies to all agents but only bounds their potential gain from misreporting by a small albeit positive amount. However, in ordinal domains, bounding these gains in a meaningful way is challenging because utilities are typically not comparable across agents. Nevertheless, one can formalize approximate strategyproofness for assignment mechanisms with the additional assumption that the agents' utility functions take values between 0 and 1 (Birrell and Pass, 2011; Carroll, 2013; Lee, 2015) .
Definition 8. Given a setting pN, M,and a bound ε P r0, 1s, a mechanism f is ε-approximately strategyproof if, for all agents i P N , all preference profiles pP i , P´iq P P N , all misreports P 1 i P P, and all u i P U
Finally, Azevedo and Budish (2015) recently proposed strategyproofness in the large, a concept which formalizes the intuition that agents who view themselves as price takers have a diminishing benefit from misreporting as markets get larger. To formalize the sense in which markets "get large," we follow Kojima and Manea (2010) and consider a sequence pN n , M n , q n q ně1 of settings with a constant set of objects (M n " M ), a growing agent population (|N n | " n), growing capacities (min jPM q n j Ñ 8 as n Ñ 8) that satisfy overall demand ( ř jPM q n j ě n).
Definition 9. For a finite set of utility functions tu 1 , . . . , u K u and a sequence of settings pN n , M n , q n q ně1 with the above properties, a mechanism is strategyproof in the large (SP-L) if, for all ε ą 0, there exists n 0 P N such that, for all n ě n 0 , no agent with a utility function from tu 1 , . . . , u K u can gain more than ε by misreporting. 10 10 The original definition of strategyproofness in the larger (SP-L) weakens strategyproofness further by also taking an interim perspective, which assumes that agents are uncertain about the other agents' reports. By omitting the interim perspective in our simplified Definition 9, we obtain a more demanding version of SP-L, and Statement 3 in our Theorem 3 shows in what sense partial strategyproofness implies this more demanding version. Note that this only makes our statement stronger.
The following proposition shows in what sense partial strategyproofness implies all of the relaxed incentive concepts defined above.
Theorem 3 (Unification). Given a setting pN, M, qq, the following hold:
1. r-partial strategyproofness for some r ą 0 implies weak SD-strategyproofness and convex strategyproofness. The converse may not hold.
2. For all ε ą 0 there exists r ă 1 such that r-partial strategyproofness implies ε-approximate strategyproofness. The converse may not hold.
3. Fix a finite set of utility functions tu 1 , . . . , u K u and a sequence pN n , M n , q n q ně1 with |N n | " n, M n " M , ř jPM q n j ě n, and min jPM q n j Ñ 8 as n Ñ 8. If the degree of strategyproofness of a mechanism f converges to 1 as n Ñ 8, then f is strategyproof in the large. The converse may not hold.
Proof. Statement 1. Observe that r-partial strategyproofness implies convex strategyproofness because any utility function from URBI(r) can take the role of u i in Definition 7, and convex strategyproofness implies weak SD-strategyproofness. Example 3 in Appendix C gives a mechanism that is convex strategyproof but violates upper invariance (and therefore partial strategyproofness).
Statement 2. Let f be r-partially strategyproof for some r ą 0. By Proposition 7 in Section G of the Online Appendix, this can be equivalently expressed in terms of the following finite system of inequalities: for all i P N , pP i , P´iq P P N (where P i : j 1 ą . . . ą j m ), P 1 i P P, and K P t1, . . . , mu, we have
With r ą 0, we obtain
By choosing r close to 1, the last term in (19) can be made arbitrarily small. This implies a property that Liu and Pycia (2016) called ε-strategy-proofness, which is equivalent to ε-approximate strategyproofness (by Theorem 1 of Mennle and Seuken (2016) ). To see why the converse does not hold, refer to our proof for Statement 3. Statement 3. Observe that any utility function u i P U P i satisfies URBI(r) for some r ă 1. Thus, we can choser ă 1 such that u k P URBIprq for all u k P tu 1 , . . . , u K u. By convergence of the degree of strategyproofness, f isr-partially strategyproof in all settings with sufficiently many agents, so that no agent can benefit from misreporting. The converse does not hold: Let f be a mechanism under which an agent gets some fixed object with probability pn´1q{n and its reported last choice with probability 1{n. This mechanism is 1{n-approximately strategyproof in the n th setting and therefore strategyproof in the large, but it is manipulable in an SD sense.
Theorem 3 significantly expands the usefulness of the partial strategyproofness concept: First, given a partially strategyproof mechanism, Statement 1 shows that weak SDstrategyproofness and convex strategyproofness are already implied. Thus, proving either of the two weaker concepts does not yield additional insights about the mechanism's incentive properties.
Second, by definition, r-partially strategyproof mechanisms make truthful reporting a dominant strategy for all agents whose utility functions satisfy URBI(r). While it is possible that other agents benefit from misreporting, Statement 2 shows that their incentive to do so is limited. This allows the formulation of straightforward and honest strategic advice that can be given to agents who participate in partially strategyproof mechanisms: They are best off reporting their preferences truthfully as long as their preference intensities for any two objects are sufficiently different; otherwise, if they are close to being indifferent between some objects, then their potential gain from misreporting may be positive but it is limited in the sense of approximate strategyproofness.
Third, convergence of the degree of strategyproofness to 1 is a straightforward formalization of the intuition that "incentives improve in large markets." It is reassuring to note that, by Statement 3, this formalization is consistent with strategyproofness in the large, a concept that Azevedo and Budish (2015) developed for this specific purpose.
Applications
In this section, we apply our new partial strategyproofness concept in two ways to derive new insights about important assignment mechanisms: In Section 5.1, we prove partial strategyproofness of the Probabilistic Serial mechanism. This yields the most demanding description of the incentive properties of this mechanism known to date, both in any finite settings and in the limit as markets get large. In Section 5.2, we show how partial strategyproofness can be employed to distinguish two common variants of the Boston mechanisms by their incentive properties, a distinction that has remained largely elusive.
New Insights about the Probabilistic Serial Mechanism
The Probabilistic Serial (PS) (Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001) mechanism is one of the most well-studied mechanism for the random assignment problem. It uses the Simultaneous Eating algorithm to determine an assignment: All agents begin by consuming probability shares of their respective most-preferred objects at equal speeds. Once an object's capacity has been completely consumed, the agents consuming this object move on to their respective next most-preferred objects and continue consuming shares of these. This process continues until all agents have collected a total of 1 in probability shares, and these shares constitute their final assignments.
The next proposition shows that PS is partially strategyproof.
Proposition 3. Given a setting pN, M, qq, PS is r-partially strategyproof for some r ą 0.
Proof. PS is LD-strategyproof by Theorem 4.7 in (Cho, 2012) . Therefore, in any fixed setting, it is r-partially strategyproof for some r ą 0 by Proposition 2.
Regarding the incentive properties of PS, Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) already showed that it is weakly SD-strategyproof (but not strategyproof), and Balbuzanov (2015) strengthened their result by showing that it is convex strategyproof. Since partial strategyproofness is strictly stronger than both properties, Proposition 3 establishes the most demanding description of its incentive properties in finite settings known to date.
PS has a special connection to the URBI(r) domain restriction: Our motivating example in the Introduction considered PS in a setting with 3 agents and 3 objects with unit capacity. Recall that agent 1 could benefit from misreporting if (and only if) 3{4¨u 1 paq ă u 1 pbq. At the same time, the degree of strategyproofness of PS in this setting is also 3{4 (see Figure 2) . Thus, the set of utility functions for which PS makes truthful reporting a dominant strategy is exactly URBIp3{4q. A similar observation holds in a setting with 4 agents and 4 objects with unit capacity, where PS makes truthful reporting a dominant strategy for exactly those utility functions that satisfy URBIp1{2q. In these settings, r-partial strategyproofness perfectly describes the incentive properties of PS. 11 We have computed the degree of strategyproofness of PS in various settings, and Figure 2 shows the results. 12 Observe that these values increase as the settings get larger. Kojima and Manea (2010) already proved that, for an arbitrary, fixed utility function, PS makes truthful reporting a dominant strategy for agents with that utility function if there are sufficiently many copies of each object. Their result and our numerical findings suggest the hypothesis that the degree of strategyproofness of PS converges to 1 as the settings get large, and Abächerli (2017) proved this hypothesis to be true. 13 In combination with Statement 3 of Theorem 3, this yields an elegant, parametric proof of the following corollary.
Corollary 1. PS is strategyproof in the large.
The partial strategyproofness concept thus also enables a refined understanding of the incentive properties of PS in large markets, providing additional structural information about the utility functions for which PS makes truthful reporting a dominant strategy. 11 In Section H of the Online Appendix, we discuss these observations in more detail as well as the curious fact that an analogous statement fails to holds for 5 agents and 5 objects with unit capacity. 12 Note that the values in Figure 2 are exact calculations (rather than estimates or simulation results).
These calculations are possible because of an equivalent formulation of partial strategyproofness in terms of a discounted notion of stochastic dominance (see Section G of the Online Appendix). The limited setting size for our calculations is owed to the fact that the algorithm must iterate over (a substantial subset of) all possible preference profiles (e.g., p4!q 16 ą 10 22 for n " 16 and m " 4). 13 Abächerli proved this as part of a Master's thesis supervised by the authors of the present paper.
Comparing Variants of the Boston Mechanism
Many school districts around the world employ school choice mechanisms to assign students to seats at public schools. In addition to the students' preferences, these mechanisms take into account priorities (Abdulkadiroglu et al., 2006) . While the priorities can depend on grades, siblings, or walk zones, they are almost always "coarse" in the sense that a substantial number of students fall into the same priority classes. Ties between such students must be broken randomly. In these situations, the school choice mechanisms can be modeled as random assignment mechanisms.
The Boston mechanism (BM) (Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez, 2003) is frequently used in the United States. Under BM, students apply to their respective first choices in the first round, and schools accept applicants by priority. If a school receives more applications than it has seats, then it rejects the applications of students with the lowest priorities. Rejected students enter the second round, where they apply to their respective second choices. Again, schools accept additional applicants according to priority and up to capacity, and they reject the remaining applicants once all seats are filled. This process continues with third, fourth, etc. choices until all seats are taken or all students have been assigned.
One notable aspect of BM is that a student who has been rejected by her first choice may find that all seats at her second choice have been taken in the first round as well. Thus, when applying to her second choice in the second round, she effectively wastes one round where she could have competed for unfilled seats at other schools. This makes "skipping exhausted schools" an obvious heuristic for manipulation. A different variant, the adaptive Boston mechanism (ABM), is more common in Europe (Dur, Mennle and Seuken, 2017) . 14 Under ABM, students apply to their best available choice in every round. Skipping exhausted schools therefore becomes ineffective.
Intuitively, this makes ABM less susceptible to manipulation than BM. However, this difference is surprisingly challenging to formalize. Pathak and Sönmez (2013) proposed a natural concept for comparing mechanisms by their vulnerability to manipulation, but this concept fails to capture the difference between BM and ABM: For the case of strict and fixed priorities, it indicates equivalence, and for the case of random priorities, the comparison is inconclusive (Dur, Mennle and Seuken, 2017) . Interestingly, we can use partial strategyproofness to recover a meaningful distinction between BM and ABM by exploiting randomness in the priorities.
To state this result formally, we require additional notation: A priority order π j is a strict order over agents, where π j : i ą i 1 indicates that agent i has priority over agent i 1 at object j. We denote by Π the set of all possible priority orders. A priority profile π " pπ j q jPM P Π M is a collection of priority orders of all objects, and π is a single priority profile if π j " π j 1 for all j, j 1 P M . A priority distribution P is a probability distribution over priority profiles Π M , and P supports all single priority profiles if Prπs ą 0 for all single priority profiles π. A school choice mechanism ϕ is a mapping ϕ : P NˆΠM Ñ X that selects a deterministic assignment based on a preference profile and a priority profile. BM and ABM are examples of such school choice mechanisms. Finally, for a priority distribution P, we define ϕ P pP q " ř πPΠ Prπs¨ϕpP, πq. Then f " ϕ P is a random assignment mechanism, and it captures the strategic situation of agents who believe that priorities are drawn according to P.
With this, we can formalize the distinction between BM and ABM in terms of their incentive properties by studying the mechanisms BM P and ABM P .
Proposition 4. Given a setting pN, M,and a priority distribution P that supports all single priority orders, BM P and ABM P are upper invariant and ABM P is swap monotonic. However, BM P violates swap monotonicity if m ě 4, n ě 4, and ř jPM q j " n.
Proof. For all priority profiles π P Π M , upper invariance of BMp¨, πq and ABMp¨, πq is obvious. Since BM P and ABM P are simply convex combinations of these mechanisms for different priority profiles, they inherit this property. Next, observe that ABMp¨, πq is monotonic (i.e., for all i P N , all pP i , P´iq P P N , all P 1 i P N P i with P i : a ą b but P i : b ą a, we have ABM i,b ppP i , P´iq, πq ď ABM i,b ppP 1 i , P´iq, πq), and this property is again inherited by ABM P . Lemma 3 in Appendix D shows that ABM P i pP i , P´iq ‰ ABM P i pP 1 i , P´iq implies existence of a single priority profile π with ABM i,b ppP i , P´iq, πq ă ABM i,b ppP 1 i , P´iq, πq. With this, monotonicity of ABM P , and the fact that P supports all single priority profiles, we obtain swap monotonicity of ABM P . Example 4 in Appendix D shows that BM P violates swap monotonicity in the respective settings.
Proposition 4 provides a formal justification for the intuition that "ABM has better incentive properties than BM": If priorities are minimally random in the sense that all single priority profiles are possible, then ABM P is r-partially strategyproof for some positive r ą 0 while BM P has a degree of strategyproofness of 0. This applies directly to various school choice markets where priorities are determined exclusively by a single uniform lottery (Lai, Sadoulet and de Janvry, 2009; Pathak and Sethuraman, 2011; Lauri, Pöder and Veski, 2014) , and it applies at least approximately in markets with coarse priorities and random tie-breaking (Erdil and Ergin, 2008; Dur et al., 2014) .
For the design of school choice mechanisms, Proposition 4 yields an important insight: BM, ABM, and the Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism form a hierarchy in terms of their incentive properties. Interestingly, these three mechanisms also form a second hierarchy in terms of student welfare, which, however, points in the opposite direction. 15 We thus learn that a choice between BM, ABM, and DA involves an implicit trade-off decision between incentives for truthtelling and student welfare.
For the single uniform priority distribution U (i.e., the distribution that selects all single priority profiles with equal probability), we have calculated the degrees of strategyproofness of ABM U in various settings. 16 The results are shown in Figure  3 . Observe that ρ pN,M,qq pABM U q is significantly lower than ρ pN,M,qq pPSq (Figure 2 ). Furthermore, it does not increase as the settings grow, but it appears to remain constant (i.e., ρ pN,M,qq pABM U q " 1{2 for m " 3 objects and n " 3, 6, 9 agents; and ρ pN,M,qq pABM U q " 1{3 for m " 4 objects and n " 4, 8 agents). At least for the small settings for which we are able to compute the degree of strategyproofness of ABM, these numbers support our understanding that "PS has better incentive properties than ABM."
Conclusion
In this paper, we have introduced partial strategyproofness, a new concept to understand the incentive properties of non-strategyproof assignment mechanisms. This research is motivated by the restrictive impossibility results pertaining to strategyproofness in the assignment domain as well as the prevalence of non-strategyproof assignment mechanisms in practice.
In quasi-linear domains, such as auction problems, the monetary benefit from misreporting can serve as a quantifiable proxy for the extent to which agents care about strategizing. However, such a proxy is more challenging to define in ordinal domains, where cardinal preferences are typically not comparable across agents. The partial strategyproofness concept elegantly circumvents this problem: It exploits the observation that whether an agent can manipulate an assignment mechanism is often driven by how close that agent is to being indifferent between any two objects. The URBI(r) domain restriction separates agents by this criterion. By requiring good incentives only on the restricted domain, partial strategyproofness focuses on those agents that are "conquerable" but leaves the more "difficult" agents aside. For any given mechanism, its degree of strategyproofness thus quantifies how many difficult agents must be left aside to establish truthtelling as a dominant strategy for all others.
The partial strategyproofness concept strikes a unique balance between two conflicting goals: It is strong enough to produce new insights yet weak enough to expand the mechanism design space. Regarding new insights, it allows us to provide honest and useful strategic advice to all agents. They are best off reporting their preferences truthfully if their preference intensities for any two objects are sufficiently different; otherwise, if they are close to being indifferent between some objects, then their potential gain from misreporting is at least bounded in the sense of approximate strategyproofness. Regarding the expansion of the mechanism design space, we have demonstrated that partial strategyproofness can be applied to all mechanisms that satisfy the minimal requirement of lexicographic dominance strategyproofness. In particular, these include some of the most important assignment mechanisms, like Probabilistic Serial and variants of the Boston mechanism.
An important open question is what values of r are "high enough" to provide acceptable incentive guarantees. We consider this an important and interesting subject of future research. However, we do not believe that a universal answer to this question exists. Rather, the appropriate degree of strategyproofness will depend on the particular mechanism design problem at hand. For specific markets, it could be derived from survey data or revealed preference data (e.g., when preferences are expressed in terms of bidding points). Such research could be complemented by laboratory experiments that aim to identify the role of the degree of strategyproofness in human decisions to manipulate non-strategyproof assignment mechanisms.
Despite this open question, partial strategyproofness can already guide design decisions. For example, we can use it to compare non-strategyproof assignment mechanisms by their incentive properties (as we have illustrated by applying it to PS, ABM, and BM). In addition, the parametric nature of partial strategyproofness enables new quantifiable trade-offs between incentives and other design desiderata. In (Mennle and Seuken, 2017b) , we have used it to identify the possible and necessary trade-offs between strategyproofness and efficiency that can be achieved via hybrid mechanisms. Going forward, we are confident that the partial strategyproofness concept will be a useful addition to the mechanism designer's toolbox and that it will facilitate the study of non-strategyproof assignment mechanisms and the design of new ones. • P 0 " P 1 i and P K " P i , • for all k P t0, . . . , K´1u we have P k P N P k`1 .
Intuitively, such a transition resembles a series of consecutive swaps that transform the preference order P 1 i into the preference order P i . The canonical transition (from P 1 i to P i ) is a particular transition that is inspired by the bubble-sort algorithm: Initially, we set P 0 " P 1 i . The preference orders P 1 , . . . , P K are constructed in phases. In the first phase, we identify the highest ranking object under P i that is not ranked in the same position under P 1 i , say j. Then we construct the preference orders P 1 , P 2 , . . . by swapping j with the respective next-more preferred objects. When j has reached the same position under P k as under P i , the first phase ends. Likewise, at the beginning of the second phase, we identify the object that is ranked highest under P i of those objects that are not ranked in the same positions under P k ; and new preference orders are constructed by swapping this object up to its final position under P i . Subsequent phases are analogous. The construction ends when the last created preference order P K coincides with P i .
Consider a fixed setting pN, M,and a mechanism f that is swap monotonic and upper invariant. Given an agent i P N , a preference profile pP i , P´iq P P N , and a misreport P 1 i P P, we must verify Statement A: If j is the highest-ranking object under P i for which i's assignment changes, then i's assignment for j should decrease strictly if i reports P 1 i instead of P i . Let
where P i and P 1 i coincide on the top-k choices but j k`1 ‰ j 1 k`1 , and consider the canonical transition from P 1 i to P i . In the first phase, the object j k`1 is swapped upward in P 1 i until it reaches the pk`1q st position. By upper invariance, i's assignment for the top-k choices j 1 , . . . , j k does not change during this phase. Moreover, by swap monotonicity, i's assignment for j k`1 cannot decrease. Initially, again by upper invariance, it does not change for the remainder of the canonical transition. Suppose that i's assignment for j k`1 changes strictly during the first phase. Then a change of report from P i to P 1 i must lead to a strict decrease in i's assignment for j k`1 , and i's assignment for any of the more preferred objects j 1 , . . . , j k does not change. But this is precisely Statement A for the combination i, pP i , P´iq, P 1 i . Alternatively, suppose that i's assignment for j k`1 does not change during the first phase. Then swap monotonicity implies that i's assignment cannot change at all during this phase. In this case, we proceed to the second phase, where the arguments are analogous. Finally, if i's assignment does not change in any phase, then it does not change at all, which would also be consistent with Statement A.
B. Proof of Lemma 2 for Proposition 1
Lemma 2. The mechanismf constructed in the proof of Proposition 1 is r-partially strategyproof and manipulable for agent i with utility functionũ i .
Proof. Observe that, underf , i's assignment is independent of the other agents' preference reports, so the mechanism is strategyproof for all other agents except i. Thus, we can guarantee r-partial strategyproofness off by verifying that truthful reporting maximizes i's expected utility for any preference order P i and any utility function u i P U P i that satisfies URBI(r).
If P i : a ą b, then i's assignment remains unchanged, unless i claims to prefer b to a (i.e.,P i : b ą a). If a is i's reported last choice underP i , then the change in i's expected utility from the misreport is´δ b¨ui paq`δ b¨ui pbq ď 0. Ifd ‰ a is i's reported last choice, then this change is´δ a¨ui paq`δ b¨ui pbq`pδ a´δb q¨u i pdq. Since δ a ă δ b by assumption, this value strictly increases if i ranks its true last choice d last. Thus, i's gain from misreporting is upper bounded bý δ a¨ui paq`δ b¨ui pbq`pδ a´δb q¨u i pdq
"´δ a¨ˆui paq´min jPM u i pjq˙`δ b¨ˆui pbq´min jPM u i pjq˙.
This bound is guaranteed to be weakly negative if δ a ě r¨δ b , where we use the fact that u i satisfies URBI(r). Next, if P i : b ą a, then i's assignment from truthful reporting stochastically dominates any assignment that i can obtain by misreporting.
Finally, we need to verify that i finds a beneficial misreport if its utility function is u i . Let P 1 i be the same preference order asP i , except that a and b trade positions. The change in i's expected utility from reporting P 1 i iś δ a¨ũi paq`δ b¨ũi pbq`pδ a´δb q¨ũ i pdq (24)
where d ‰ b is i's true last choice. This change is strictly positive if δ a ăr¨δ b .
C. Omitted Statements in the Proof of Theorem 3
Example 3 (Convex strategyproofness does not imply upper invariance). Consider a setting with one agent i and three objects a, b, c with unit capacity. Suppose that ranking b over c leads to an assignment of y i " p0, 1{2, 1{2q for a, b, c, respectively, and ranking c over b leads to x i " p1{4, 0, 3{4q. Without loss of generality, let u i be such that the utility for the last choice is 0 and the utility for the second choice is 1. Then i can only benefit from misreporting in the following two cases:
1. P i : a ą b ą c and u i paq ą 2, 2. P i : c ą b ą a and u i pcq P p1, 2q.
The mechanism is therefore convex strategyproof but not upper invariant.
D. Omitted Statements in the Proof of Proposition 4
Example 4 (Violation of swap monotonicity by BM). Consider a setting with n ě 4 agents N " t1, 2, 3, 4, . . . , nu, m ě 4 objects M " ta, b, c, d, . . .u, and capacities q j ě 1 such that ř jPM q j " n. Let agent 1 have preference order P 1 : a ą b ą c ą d ą . . ., let agents 2 through q a`qc`qd have preference order P¨: a ą b ą . . ., and for all objects j P M zta, b, du, let there be q j agents with preference order P¨: j ą . . .. Then BM P 1 pP 1 , P´1q " px, y, 0, 1´x´y, 0, . . .q for some x P p0, 1q, y P p0, 1´xq because P supports all single priority profiles. However, if i reports P 1 i : a ą c ą b ą d ą . . ., then BM P 1 pP 1 1 , P´1q " px, 0, 0, 1´x, 0 . . .q. Observe that agent 1's assignment changes but its assignment for c remains unchanged, a contradiction to swap monotonicity.
Lemma 3. Given a setting pN, M, qq, for all priority distributions P, all i P N , all
then there exists a priority profile π˚such that
Proof. From ABM P i pP i , P´iq ‰ ABM P i pP 1 i , P´iq it follows that there exists a priority profile π 0 with ABM i ppP i , P´iq, π 0 q ‰ ABM i ppP 1 i , P´iq, π 0 q. Let ABM i,j ppP i , P´iq, π 0 q " 1 and ABM i,j 1 ppP 1 i , P´iq, π 0 q " 1, i.e., i gets j by reporting P i and i gets j 1 ‰ j by reporting P 1 i , and let K be the round in which i applies to (or skips) a when reporting P i . There are 6 cases:
P i : j ą ą ą a or P i : j 1 1 1 ą ą ą a: Then upper invariance implies j 1 " j, a contradiction.
j " " " b: Then monotonicity implies j 1 " b, a contradiction.
j " " " a and j 1 1 1 " " " b. Then i receives a or b in round K under the different reports, respectively. Observe that the application process before this round is independent of whether i reports P i or P 1 i . For all k P t1, . . . , K´1u, let N k be the agents who receive their object in round k, and let πj be a priority order which, first, gives highest priority to all agents in N 1 , then all agents in N 2 , and so on, and second, ranks i directly after the agents in N K´1 . Then the single priority profile π˚where all objects have the same priority order πj is a single priority profile with ABM i,a ppP i , P´iq, π˚q " ABM i,b ppP 1 i , P´iq, π˚q " 1. P i : b ą ą ą j and P i : b ą ą ą j 1 1 1 : If a and b are both exhausted at the end of round K´1, then i skips both objects, independent of its report. This implies j " j 1 , a contradiction. Next, if a is not exhausted at the end of round K, then i would receive b by reporting P 1 i , again a contradiction. Analogously, we can rule out the case that a is not exhausted at the end of round K. Next, if a is exhausted at the end of round K´1 but b is not, then i skips a and applies to b, independent of its report. Symmetrically, the application process is independent of the report of i if b is exhausted at the end of round K´1 but b is not. Both imply contradictions.
j " " " a and P i : b ą ą ą j 1 1 1 : If b is exhausted at the end of round K´1, then i would skip b when reporting P 1 i and still receive a. Thus, there is still capacity of b available at the beginning of round K. Let π˚be the same single priority profile as constructed in the third case. Then ABM i,a ppP i , P´iq, π˚q " ABM i,b ppP 1 i , P´iq, π˚q " 1. j 1 1 1 " " " b and P i : b ą ą ą j: This case is symmetric to the previous case but where the roles of a and b are inverted.
Thus, the single priority profile π˚exists in all cases that do not imply contradictions.
Online Appendix

E. Equivalence of Swap Monotonicity and
Strategyproofness for Deterministic Mechanisms
Proposition 5. A deterministic mechanism f is strategyproof if and only if it is swap monotonic.
Proof. Since deterministic mechanisms are just special cases of random mechanisms, Theorem 1 applies: A deterministic mechanism f is strategyproof if and only if it is swap monotonic, upper invariant, and lower invariant. Thus, strategyproofness implies swap monotonicity (i.e., sufficiency in Proposition 5). For necessity, observe that swap monotonicity implies upper and lower invariance for deterministic mechanisms: If a swap (say from P i : a ą b to P 1 i : b ą a) affects an agent's assignment, then the assignment must change strictly for the two objects a and b that are swapped. But under a deterministic mechanism, this change can only be from 0 to 1 or from 1 to 0. The only possible changes are therefore the ones where an agent receives a with certainty if it reports P i : a ą b and receives b with certainty if she reports P 1 i : b ą a.
F. Comparing Mechanisms by Vulnerability to
Manipulation and Degree of Strategyproofness
The next proposition shows that the comparison of mechanisms by their vulnerability to manipulation and by their degrees of strategyproofness are consistent but not equivalent.
Proposition 6. For any setting pN, M,and mechanisms f, g, the following hold:
1. If g is strongly as manipulable as f , then ρ pN,M,qq pf q ě ρ pN,M,qq pgq.
2. If ρ pN,M,qq pf q ą ρ pN,M,qq pgq, and if f and g are comparable by the strongly as manipulable as relation, then g is strongly as manipulable as f .
In Proposition 6, the strongly as manipulable as relation is extended to random assignment mechanisms as follows:
Definition 10. For a given setting pN, M,and two mechanisms f, g, we say that g is strongly as manipulable as f if, for all agents i P N , all preference profiles pP i , P´iq P P N , and all utility functions u i P U P i , the following holds: If there exists a misreport P 1 i P P such that
then there exists a (possibly different) misreport P 2 i P P such that
In words, g is strongly as manipulable as f if any agent who can manipulate f in a given situation can also manipulate g in the same situation.
Proof of Proposition 6. Statement 1. Observe that, if f is strongly as manipulable as g, then any agent who can manipulate g also finds a manipulation to f . Thus, the set of utility functions on which g makes truthful reporting a dominant strategy cannot be larger than the set of utilities on which f does the same. This in turn implies ρ pN,M,qq pf q ě ρ pN,M,qq pgq.
Statement 2. Observe that, if ρ pN,M,qq pf q ą ρ pN,M,qq pgq, then there exists a utility functionũ in URBI`ρ pN,M,qq pf q˘, which is not in URBI`ρ pN,M,qq pgq˘, and for which g is manipulable, but f is not. Thus, f cannot be strongly as manipulable as g, but the converse is possible.
G. Discounted Dominance and Partial
Strategyproofness
In this section, we present r-discounted dominance, a new dominance notion that generalizes stochastic dominance but includes r as a discount factor. We then provide an alternative definition of partial strategyproofness by showing that it is equivalent to the incentive concept induced by r-discounted dominance.
Definition 11. For a bound r P r0, 1s, a preference order P i P P with P i : j 1 ą . . . ą j m , and assignment vectors x i , y i , we say that x i r-discounted dominates y i at P i if, for all ranks K P t1, . . . , mu, we have
Observe that, for r " 1, this is precisely the same as stochastic dominance. However, for r ă 1, the difference in the agent's assignment for the k th choice is discounted by the factor r k . Analogous to stochastic dominance for SD-strategyproofness, we can use r-discounted dominance (r-DD) to define the corresponding incentive concept.
Definition 12. Given a setting pN, M,and a bound r P p0, 1s, a mechanism f is r-DD-strategyproof if, for all agents i P N , all preference profiles pP i , P´iq P P N , and all misreports P 1 i P P, f i pP i , P´iq r-discounted dominates f i pP 1 i , P´iq at P i . The next theorem yields the equivalence to r-partial strategyproofness.
Proposition 7. Given a setting pN, M,and a bound r P r0, 1s, a mechanism f is r-partially strategyproof if and only if it is r-DD-strategyproof.
Proof. Given the setting pN, M, qq, we fix an agent i P N , a preference profile pP i , P´iq P P N , and a misreports P 1 i P P. The following claim establishes equivalence of the r-partial strategyproofness constraints and the r-DD-strategyproofness constraints for any such combination pi, pP i , P´iq, P 1 i q with x " f i pP i , P´iq and y " f i pP 1 i , P´iq.
Claim 1. Given a setting pN, M, qq, a preference order P i P P, assignment vectors x, y, and a bound r P r0, 1s, the following are equivalent:
A. For all utility functions u i P U P i X URBI(r) we have ř jPM u i pjq¨x j ě ř jPM u i pjq¨y j . B. x i r-discounted dominates y i at P i .
Proof of Claim 1. Sufficiency (B ñ A). Let P i : j 1 ą . . . ą j m . Assume towards contradiction that Statement B holds, but that for some utility function u i P U P i X URBI(r), we have m ÿ l"1 u i pj l q¨px j l´y j l q ă 0.
Without loss of generality, we can assume min jPM u i pjq " 0. Let δ k " x j k´y j k and let SpKq " K ÿ k"1 u i pj k q¨px j k´y j k q "
and let K be the smallest rank for which inequality (39) is strict. Then the value ∆ "
is strictly positive. Let D ě d ą 0, and let u i be the utility function defined by
This utility function satisfies URBI(r). Furthermore, we have ÿ jPM u i pjq¨x j´ÿ jPM u i pjq¨y j " m ÿ l"1 upj l q¨px i,j l´y i,j l q
" D¨K ÿ k"1 r k¨p x j k´y j k q`d¨m´1 ÿ k"K`1 r k¨p x j k´y j k q ď´D¨∆`d.
For d ă D¨∆, ř jPM u i pjq¨x j´ř jPM u i pjq¨y j is strictly negative, a contradiction.
This concludes the proof of Proposition 7.
Proposition 7 generalizes the equivalence between EU-strategyproofness and SDstrategyproofness (Erdil, 2014) . Moreover, it yields an alternative definition of rpartial strategyproofness in terms of discounted dominance. This shows that the partial strategyproofness concept integrates nicely into the landscape of existing incentive concepts, many of which are defined using dominance notions (e.g., SD-, weak SD-, LD-, and ST 17 -strategyproofness).
The dominance interpretation also unlocks the partial strategyproofness concept to algorithmic analysis: Recall that the definition of r-partial strategyproofness imposes inequalities that have to hold for all utility functions within the set URBI(r). This set is infinite, which makes algorithmic verification of r-partial strategyproofness infeasible via its original definition. However, by the equivalence from Proposition 7, it suffices to verify that all (finitely many) constraints for r-discounted dominance are satisfied (i.e., the inequalities (30) from Definition 11). These inequalities can also be used to encode r-partial strategyproofness as linear constraints to an optimization problem. This enables an automated search in the set of r-partially strategyproof mechanisms while optimizing for some other design objective under the automated mechanism design paradigm (Sandholm, 2003) .
H. URBI(r) and the Probabilistic Serial Mechanism 3-by-3 Settings: Consider the same setting as in the motivating example in the introduction with three agents N " t1, 2, 3u and three objects M " ta, b, cu with unit capacity. Recall that PS 1 pP 1 , P´1q " p3{4, 0, 1{4q,
PS 1 pP 1 1 , P´1q " p1{2, 1{3, 1{6q.
The gain in expected utility for agent 1 from misreporting is thereforé 1{4¨u 1 paq`1{3¨u 1 pbq´1{12¨u 1 pcq.
This is weakly negative if and only if u 1 pbq´u 1 pcq u 1 paq´u 1 pcq ď 3{4,
which is the condition for u 1 to satisfy URBIp3{4q. Next, recall that we have computed the degree of strategyproofness of PS in this setting to be ρ pN,M,qq pPSq " 3{4 ( Figure 2 in Section 5.1). Any agent therefore has a dominant strategy to report truthfully under PS in this setting if and only if that agent's utility function satisfies URBIp3{4q. In other words, the set of utility functions for which PS induces good incentives is precisely URBIp3{4q.
4-by-4 Settings (adapted from (Abächerli, 2017)): Next, we show a similar insight for a setting with four agents N " t1, 2, 3, 4u and four objects M " ta, b, c, du with unit capacity. We have computed the degree of strategyproofness of PS in this setting to be ρ pN,M,qq pPSq " 1{2 ( Figure 2 in Section 5.1). Consider the preferences
and the misreport
by agent 1. The resulting assignments are PS 1 pP 1 , P´1q " p3{4, 0, 0, 1{4q,
PS 1 pP 1 1 , P´1q " p1{2, 1{2, 0, 0q.
Thus, agent 1's gain in expected utility from misreporting iś 1{4¨u 1 paq`1{2¨u 1 pbq´1{4¨u 1 pdq.
This is weakly negative if and only if u 1 pbq´u 1 pcq u 1 paq´u 1 pcq ď 1{2.
Next, consider the preference profile
and the misreport P 1 1 : a ą c ą b ą d.
Then PS 1 pP 1 , P´1q " p1{4, 1{2, 0, 1{4q,
PS 1 pP 1 1 , P´1q " p1{4, 1{3, 1{3, 1{12q,
so that the gain in expected utility for agent 1 from misreporting iś 1{6¨u 1 pbq`1{3¨u 1 pcq´1{6¨u 1 pdq.
This is weakly negative if and only if u 1 pcq´u 1 pdq u 1 pbq´u 1 pdq ď 1{2.
Observe that conditions (56) and (63) are precisely equivalent to the requirement that u 1 satisfies URBIp1{2q. Thus, since ρ pN,M,qq pPSq " 1{2, every agent with a utility function that satisfies URBIp1{2q has a dominant strategy to report truthfully. However, the two examples show that every agent with a utility function that violates URBIp1{2q can beneficially manipulate the mechanism in some situations. This implies that, in the setting with 4 agents and 4 objects in unit capacity, the set of utility functions for which PS makes truthful reporting a dominant strategy is precisely URBIp1{2q.
5-by-5 Settings (adapted from (Abächerli, 2017)): In a setting with 5 agents N " t1, 2, 3, 4, 5u and 5 objects M " ta, b, c, d, eu with unit capacity, we again consider PS. Using the same algorithm as in Section 5.1, we can determine the degree of strategyproofness in this setting to be ρ pN,M,qq pPSq " 1{2. The utility function u i with u i paq " 7.99, u i pbq " 4, u i pcq " 2, u i pdq " 1, u i peq " 0 (64)
violates URBIp1{2q because u i paq´min jPM u i pjq u i pbq´min jPM u i pjq " 4 7.99 ą 1{2.
However, exhaustive search over all possible preference profiles and misreports (using a computer) reveals that an agent with this utility function can not benefit from misreporting. Thus, in the setting with 5 agents and 5 objects, the set of utility functions for which PS makes truthful reporting a dominant strategy is strictly larger than URBIp1{2q. This contrasts tightness of this set of the 3-by-3 and 4-by-4 settings.
